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Why protection against cognitive warfare depends on training, cultural change and building sensemaking into everyone, including children The perimeter has moved. For a generation, organisational and national security was organised around things that could be counted and walled off: a border, a building, a network. The defining threat of the present decade respects none of those boundaries, because it does not target infrastructure at all. It targets the human capacity to inte

Economic Security Intelligence | Emerging Risks Global Introduction Most of us were taught to think about resilience in terms of alternatives. If the main route fails, use the other one. If a supplier goes down, switch to the second source. If a site is lost, move to the backup. It is a sound principle. But it rests on an assumption that rarely gets tested: that the alternative does not share the same threat. This month, in the Gulf, that assumption was tested. What Has Chang

Biosecurity is the next front and it belongs in your risk assessment Dr Paul Wood. Founder and CEO of Emerging Risks Global. Russia rarely invents a problem. It finds one that already exists, inside a community, an industry or a national argument and applies pressure until the crack becomes a fault. Local grievance supplies the raw material. Amplification does the work. That principle makes the threat picture facing a British security manager easier to read, because what is a

Cognitive warfare turns polarisation into an attack surface. Dr Paul Wood explains how adversaries exploit it and five steps security leaders can take now.

The case for curiosity as the active ingredient in cognitive defence Most counter-disinformation work rests on an assumption that has rarely been examined with any rigour; that people hold false beliefs because they lack accurate information. Correct the record, raise the literacy, label the content, fund the fact-checkers and the problem contracts. More than a decade of public investment has followed that logic across education, platform policy and strategic communications.

Whole-of-society defence is the right idea. The trouble is that the thing we have left undefended is the ability to think. By Dr Paul Wood Ask most people to picture national defence and you get hardware. Jets, submarines, a soldier on a ridge. Ask someone a bit more knowing and they say cyber and feel rather modern for having said it. Hardly anyone names the ground on which the next serious contest will actually be fought, largely because it does not photograph well. That gr

A Position Paper on UK Cognitive Resilience Architecture Dr Paul Wood Chief Executive Officer, Emerging Risks Global April 2026

In the contemporary security landscape, the identification and mitigation of potential threats have become increasingly complex and multifaceted. The process of hostile profile detection, particularly within the UK context, necessitates a nuanced understanding of behavioural indicators, technological tools and intelligence frameworks. It is imperative to acknowledge that the detection of hostile profiles is not merely a reactive measure but a proactive strategy aimed at safeg

AI-assisted social engineering is already producing significant losses. The research trajectory points toward something more dangerous: systems capable of building their own personas, authoring their own scripts, and evaluating their own effectiveness without human direction. Security leaders who understand this trajectory now and build the human factors defences it demands will not be caught unprepared when early operational versions appear. Dr. Paul Wood CSyP ChCSP FSyI In